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RECENT DECISIONS

W1u.s--CoNsTRUCTION-TEsTAMENTARY INTENT-In a will drawn for
her by a layman, testatrix inserted in her own words a clause reading, "It is my
belief that 120 acres ••• owned by my deceased husband, John Cagley, subject
to a life estate willed to me, be distributed to his four nieces and nephews ••••"
In fact, her husband's will had not specifically disposed of the remainder, and
testatrix had in addition to the· life estate, taken the remainder as residuary
devisee. Held, The clause was a valid devise of the property to the four named
beneficiaries. Layton v. Tucker, (Iowa, 1946) 23 N.W. (2d) 297.
The court's decision rests on its construction of the words, "It is my belief."
It concludes that the phrase had reference to testatrix' mistaken impression that
the fee to the land had passed to her on her daughter's death, thus rejecting a
more literal and grammatical interpretation which would have had the phrase
read either, "It is my belief that 120 acres ••• should be distributed to his four
nieces and nephews," 1 or " ••• was distributed to his four nieces and
nephews." 2 It is submitted that on the recorded facts an interpretation linking
the phrase, "It is my belief," to the dispositive part of the clause would have
been more accurate. It would seem that testatrix' choice of words indicated
confusion in her own mind as to -the exact status of the title to the land but
showed her desire that the land be divided among the nieces and nephews irr~spective of the doubtful condition of the title. In reaching its conclusion the
the church and premises be kept in repair, etc., held a. trust); similarly, Episcopal
City Mission v. Appleton, II7 Mass. 326 (1875); Stanley v. Colt, 5 Wall. (72 U.S.)
II9 (1866); Petition of Tuttle, 80 N.H. 36, 112 A. 397 (1921). Cases in which
transfers were held to create covenants or trusts are collected in 7 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1 II9
(1907), 3 L.R.A. (n.s.) 741 (1906), 9 L.R.A. (n.s.) 758 (1907).
1 If testatrix in the clause expressed a desire as to the future 'disposition of property which she doubted to be her own, it is questionable wl).ether the court would have
given it effect as a devise. T, suspecting that property belongs to X, leaves a will in
which he requests that the property be given to.A. If the property actually belongs to
X, T's attempted disposition is ineffective whether stated as a request or an order.
Snyder v. Snider, 202 Ky. 321, 259 S.W. 700 (1924); Prince v. Prince, 64 Wash.
552, II7 P. 255 (19u). But if in fact the property belongs to T, on principle there
would seem to be no reason why his formally executed wishes as to the disposition of his
property should not be respected. It is clear that but for the mistake of fact, T would
have devised the property to A. The situation is substantially different from that in
which the testator includes words bearing on the future use of property which he devises
in fee. See note 4, infra. However, the clause might be declared invalid as lacking
the necessary testamentary intent at the time the will was executed. The question turns
on whether it is a requirement of testamentary "intent'' that the testator believe he
owns the interest he attempts to bequeath or devise.
2
The contestants apparently argued that testatrix meant the clause 0nly as a
recital of a distribution which had already been made, and that therefore no property
was devised. The court rejected the argument on the ground that there was no evidence testatrix had any reason for assuming such a distribution. It is possible, however, that even if the court had found an attempted but ineffective disposition, the
clause could have been int_erpreted as accomplishing the testatrix' main purpose. The
court might have read the testatrix' intent from the clause as being, "I believe that the
property has already been distributed to the four nieces and nephews, but if not, it is
my will this property be given to them." See In re Dimmitt's Estate, 141 Neb. 413,
3 N.W. (2d) 752 (1942), 41 MxcH. L. REv. 751 (1943).
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court went on the assumption that it was interpreting a will and laid down as its
cardinal purpose the determination of the testatrix' intent,8 overlooking perhaps
a more fundamen;al problem. In regard to this clause, it is not so much a question of construing a will as determining whether a will exists; whether, in short,
the clause displays the necessary animus testandi to make -it a valid testamentary
disposition of property. 4 The court assumes, without deciding, that the rejected
alternatives, if followed, would have rendered the clause totally ineffective as a
• devise; ,and its choice of alternatives can thus be justified by the general rule of
construction that where there is more than one possible interpretation of an instrument, an interpretation which renders it valid is to be favored. By the construction it adopts, the court avoids the . difficult problems which would have
arisen had it concluded that the clause was an attempt to make a devise of
property testatrix did not believe to. be her own. Once granted that the clause
is testamentary, the conclusion Teached becomes inevitable since there can be no
doubt as to whom she intended to be the beneficiaries. The only remaining
problem is to give effect to that desire. While the courts deny themselves the
right to rewrite a will, they have gone far in remoulding and recasting the testator's words in order to give effect to his intent. 5 All that was required in the
principal case was to say as the court did that the word, "belief," was used by
testatrix to indicate her understanding as to the manner if!. which she had
acquired title to the property, thus making the clause part of an irrelevant
mistake of fact. The court, without attempting to explain the grammar of a
sentence which was imperfect at best, merely,states that the dispositive part of
the clause stands alone as a valid devise, unqualified by the ambiguous first half
of the sentence.
J. R. Swenson

3 This is perhaps the most frequently encountered rule of construction.
Cf.
Hardenbergh v. Ray, 151 U.S. u2, 14 S. Ct. 305 {1894); Perrin v. Blake, HARGRAVES LAW TRACTS 489 (1787); Upham v. Plankington, 152 Wis. 275, 140
N.W. 5 (1913); Johnson v. Bowen, 85 N.J. Eq. 76, 95 A. 370 (1915). The statement, however, is oftentimes misleading. See 2 SIMES, FuTIJRE INTERESTS II (1936);
ATKINSON, WILLS 757 (1937).
4 Generally the question of testamentary intent is raised in connection with the
probate of an instrument, but it may also be encountered in connection with the interpretation of a clause in a probated will. In the latter case, the problem is whether the
testator meant to make a devise of property or was rather incuding non-testamentary
observations in· an otherwise valid will. One prime example of this may be found in the
handling of the so-called "precatory trusts." Compare Matter of Hayes, 263 N.Y. 219,
188 N.E. 716 (1934), with Williams v. Williams Committee, 253 Ky. 30, 68 S.W.
(2d) 395 (1933).
l5 For example, courts have transposed words, phrases, and sentences, In re will of
Richter, 212 Iowa 38, 234 N.W. 285 (1931); substituted words, Barrett v. Barrett,
134 N. J. Eq; 138, 34 A.. (2d) 579 (1943); read phrases in a sense not ordinarily
attributed to them, Wilkison v. Wilkison, 130 Kan. 424, 286 P. 282 (1930); supplied
omitted words, In re Bien's Will, 42 N.Y.S. (2d) 138 (1943); rejected superfluous or
repugnant words, Crawford v. Crawford, 290 Ky. 542, 162 S.W. (2d) 4 (1942); and
corrected grammer and punctuation, Herbert v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.,
131 N.J. Eq. 330, 25 A. (2d) 7 (1942).

